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Healthcare systems across the globe face common problems: controlling costs while improving quality and performance. In response, the past decade has 
seen unprecedented activity in health system reform, with many 
countries turning their attention to the use of explicit financial 
incentives to reward provider performance. Such programmes 
draw on a range of economic and psychological theories and are 
based on a whole set of assumptions of uncertain validity and 
strength (1,2): 
•	Financial incentives will motivate behavioural change
•	Such behavioural change will in turn deliver improvements 
in quality and performance
•	Policy-makers and managers can distinguish between those 
aspects of clinical activity that would benefit from financial 
incentives and those that would be affected adversely
•	The net benefits of financial incentives outweigh any 
unintended and dysfunctional consequences.
Even if the above assumptions are well founded, the success of a 
particular incentive scheme will depend on a number of design 
choices which influence how providers experience and respond 
to financial incentives.  Key elements of programme design:
Purpose
The objectives and targets expressed in an incentive scheme 
will determine its success as they form the criteria against 
which progress against achievement is assessed. Although 
most schemes focus on quality, performance objectives could 
potentially cover a wide range of dimensions including cost-
effectiveness, patient experience and equity. 
Individual or group rewards
Financial incentive schemes differ in relation to the unit of 
assessment incentivized to receive financial rewards. Payments 
could be targeted at individual health professionals, clinical 
teams, or larger organisational units. In theory, financial 
rewards should go to those responsible for delivering improved 
performance, but in practice given the interdependent nature 
of healthcare, attribution an individual practitioner is often 
difficult and most schemes target rewards on groups of 
practitioners or whole organisations.
Magnitude of rewards
The size of the financial reward provided by a financial 
incentive scheme is perhaps the key factor motivating changes 
in behaviour. Economic theory predicts that the higher the 
financial reward the larger will be the provider response and their 
impact on performance. However, due to diminishing marginal 
utility of income this will only work up to a certain level. This 
observation is linked to the ‘target income hypothesis’ which 
holds that once income reaches a certain level then additional 
payments will not lead to further significant improvement.
Absolute versus relative performance
The performance criteria or thresholds used to determine 
whether payments are triggered. may be absolute or relative. 
Absolute standards (such as specific targets for key measures) 
have the advantage that there is no uncertainty over whether a 
standard has been met. Relative standards (such as rewards for 
high positioning in league tables and rankings) focus instead 
on performance relative to peers and may stimulate continuous 
improvement. However, because they stimulate competition 
such rewards may impact deleteriously on other health system 
goals such as collaboration and dissemination of best practices.
Scheme duration
Expectations about the longevity of a financial incentive 
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scheme (and performance measures therein) may influence 
whether providers are responsive to new schemes.  If providers 
believe that a financial scheme will operate over a long period 
then they may be more likely to invest in quality improvement 
and supporting infrastructure than if it is perceived to be only 
a temporary initiative where it would be difficult over a short 
period to recoup spending on capital expenditure.
However, as Ruth McDonald highlights in her perceptive and 
timely article, to understand why some incentive schemes are 
successful and others not, it is important to go beyond a simple 
focus on design choices and widen the lens to capture the 
mediating influence of local historical and cultural factors (3). 
Furthermore, and as McDonald points out, incentive regimes 
are not self-implementing mechanisms to change behaviour 
and  success depends crucially on the way in which a scheme 
is implemented, including the technological, administrative 
and supporting infrastructure used to embed and sustain 
new institutional practices. A related issue is the degree of 
provider engagement in the design and implementation of 
financial incentive schemes. There is some limited evidence 
to suggest that financial incentive schemes may achieve better 
results when they have been designed and implemented 
collaboratively with providers, for example in terms of the 
selection of performance measures/targets and where there has 
been extensive communication and consultation with providers 
about distribution of  financial awards (4).
As with all managerial interventions in addition to generating 
the desired improvements in performance, financial incentives 
can also inadvertently induce a range of unintended and 
dysfunctional consequences (5). It is important therefore, that 
the potential for adverse consequences is anticipated in the 
design of financial incentive schemes and a range of strategies 
put in place to mitigate them. Once established, schemes will 
need constant trimming, recalibrating, and balancing to ensure 
that their objectives are being met at the right cost and without 
too many unwanted effects. Potential adverse side-effects of 
financial incentive schemes include 
•	Tunnel vision—a focus on aspects of clinical performance 
that are measured and the neglect of unmeasured areas.
•	Bullying and intimidation of staff to attain performance 
targets 
•	Adverse selection—the incentive to avoid the most severely 
ill patients
•	Erosion—the potential diminution and crowding out—of 
intrinsic professional motivation as a key attribute of high 
quality healthcare
•	 Inequity—creation of perverse incentives to exclude 
disadvantaged groups
•	Over compensation—rewarding providers who already 
meet or exceed the target threshold
•	Misreporting, gaming, or fraud
Despite the enthusiasm to develop financial incentive schemes 
the empirical foundations of incentives in healthcare are rather 
weak and there is currently insufficient evidence to recommend 
widespread implementation (2). The challenge is to generate 
robust evidence on what works, under what circumstances, for 
whom and with what intended and unintended consequences. 
Yet, researchers seeking to evaluate the effectiveness of financial 
incentive schemes must overcome several barriers for findings 
to be useful to decision-makers. 
As with all research evaluations a rigorous study design 
enhances the power and credibility of the findings. The complex 
and dynamic nature of the phenomena under study suggest that 
research in this area will need to exhibit a number of features. 
It will need to be naturalistic, taking place in real world settings 
and making careful note of the mediating role of contexts 
and local contingencies. It should be mixed method and 
multidisciplinary in design, drawing on a range of quantitative 
and qualitative methods including detailed ethnographic 
approaches as well as more traditional research designs such as 
controlled experimentation, where feasible. As the phenomena 
under study are essentially dynamic (performance and change), 
longitudinal study will offer important insights over cross-
sectional designs. To provide better opportunities for theoretical 
transference and generalizability to other contexts evaluation 
studies will need sound conceptual underpinnings rather than 
relying on simple empiricism. Finally, full economic evaluation 
should be undertaken to establish the cost-effectiveness of 
financial incentives. These should consider not only the direct 
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